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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

KAPOK #150
SCAA-957

VIA: _____
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. _____

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TO : _____
FROM : ^{ATTN} C/SE

13 FEB
1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL. BOFIELD/Operational
SPECIFIC. Operational Planning for Uprising in Albania

Reference: SCAA-2010, SCAA-2006

1. We have gone over the operational planning study transmitted in SCAA-2006 with care, and find that your ideas of how to overthrow the regime, when and if this is ordered, jibe quite well with ours. It impressed us as an excellent piece of work, and is being taken fully into account in the staff planning here.

2. KUBARK's course of action vis-a-vis Albania during the next two or three years is currently the subject of intensive study on various levels here, but at this time we are not in a position to give you an idea of the conclusions or decisions that will be finally forthcoming. All of the numerous issues, diplomatic political and military, are being examined, with the expectation that the final decision will not be forthcoming for some time. We understand the difficulties in which this places the field and suggest that planning for this season's operations be placed as far as possible on the basis of a minimum and maximum objective. As a minimum objective, we propose the extension of bases and networks already established and establishment of as many new networks as the field can adequately support. As a maximum goal we propose the exploitation of these assets along the lines proposed in SCAA-2006. Our best estimate here is that 1953 will have to be another year of preparation, but if all the problems and difficulties should suddenly be resolved, and our operations develop really well, we must be in a position to exploit and follow-up any break or opportunity.

3. The thinking behind this suggestion is based on the assumption that the minimum and maximum objectives are up to a point complementary rather than conflicting. Thus, if it appeared after the 1953 operational season were well-advanced that the teams and agents were making good progress and if at the same time, the diplomatic and policy complications had been unravelled, BOFIELD should be prepared to accept the assignment of overthrowing the regime. If, on the other

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DM-967

hand, it were to appear inadvisable to attempt such a goal, KAPOK should be prepared to keep going along present lines until 1954, extending and strengthening its organization within Albania as much as possible.

4. The proposal that the overthrow of the Communist regime in Albania be maintained as a possibility for 1953 involves logistical preparations for the support of such an operation. This aspect will be dealt with in a separate dispatch.

[Chief, SE]

[SE/PP/] }
ym/5 Feb. 1953
Distribution: RI - 1
EX/SE - 1 *W.H.H.*
SE-1 - 2 ✓

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